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Researchers have begun to evaluate whether nonhuman animals share humans’ capacity for metacognitive monitoring and 
self-regulation. Using perception, memory, numerical, and foraging paradigms, they have tested apes, capuchins, a dolphin, 
macaques, pigeons, and rats. However, recent theoretical and formal-modeling work has confirmed that some paradigms 
allow the criticism that low-level associative mechanisms could create the appearance of uncertainty monitoring in animals. 
This possibility has become a central issue as researchers reflect on existing phenomena and pause to evaluate the area’s 
current status. The present authors discuss the associative question and offer our evaluation of the field. Associative mecha-
nisms explain poorly some of the area’s important results. The next phase of research in this area should consolidate the 
gains achieved by those results and work toward a theoretical understanding of the cognitive and decisional (not associative) 
capacities that animals show in some of the referent experiments. 
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 Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not 
know or remember, and they respond well to uncertainty by 
deferring response and seeking help or information. Their 
responses to doubt and uncertainty ground research on meta-
cognition, or thinking about thinking (Benjamin et al., 1998; 
Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 1995; 2007; Koriat et al., 2006; Met-
calfe, 2000; Nelson, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Serra & Dun-
losky, 2005). The idea in this field is that human minds have 
a cognitive executive that looks in on thought to evaluate its 
problems and prospects.
 When humans behave metacognitively, scientists make 
intriguing attributions about their minds. Metacognition 
reveals hierarchical structure in mind (Nelson & Narens, 
1990) because the executive oversees the rest of cognition. 
Metacognition is linked to self-awareness (Gallup, 1982) be-
cause doubt is so personal and self-oriented. Metacognition 
is linked to declarative consciousness (Koriat, 2007; Nel-
son, 1996) because we can introspect and declare states of 
knowing. Thus, metacognition is a sophisticated capacity in 
humans that might be uniquely human (Metcalfe & Kober, 
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2005). This raises the question of whether nonhuman ani-
mals share that capacity.
 To address this question, researchers have evaluated 
whether animals can adaptively monitor and respond to their 
uncertainty (e.g., Beran et al., 2006; Foote & Crystal, 2007; 
Hampton, 2001; Kornell et al., 2007; Smith et al., 1995, 
1998, 2006; Suda-King, 2008; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008; 
Washburn et al., 2006). The paradigms used in this research 
have two key features. First, they contain a mix of easy and 
difficult trials, the latter trial type so that researchers may 
stir up something like an uncertainty state. Second, they 
grant animals an additional response—beyond the primary 
discrimination responses—with which they can decline to 
complete trials of their choosing. This potentially lets them 
handle uncertainty adaptively. Animals who monitor cogni-
tion should recognize difficult trials as error-risking and de-
cline them selectively. Some animals do so, producing data 
patterns in cognitive-monitoring tasks that are strikingly 
like those of humans. This additional response is called the 
uncertainty response, and it is presently interpreted to show 
some species’ capacity for uncertainty monitoring and meta-
cognition.
 If this interpretation is correct, then these experiments tap 
theoretically important cognitive capacities in animals that 
could bear on their cognitive awareness and consciousness. 
However, the burden of proof in this area is heavy. Morgan’s 
(1906) Canon established a tradition in comparative psy-
chology of erring toward explaining animals’ behavior at the 
lowest possible psychological level. Therefore, even when 
animals perform in a way that might demonstrate metacog-
nition, researchers should consider carefully the alternative 
possibility that these performances can be explained through 
low-level, associative mechanisms based in stimulus cues 
and reinforcement contingencies. Morgan’s Canon has sel-
dom had a fatter target to shoot at than animal metacogni-
tion. This theoretical debate has become the area’s central 
issue as researchers reflect on existing phenomena and 
pause to evaluate the area’s current status (Carruthers, 2008; 
Proust, 2003; Smith et al., 2008; Staddon et al., 2007). Here, 
we discuss this debate and offer our evaluation of the field. 
We appreciate the opportunity for a dialog on this important 
issue.
 Criticism begins at home. We will illustrate the interpreta-
tive tension in this field using the paradigm that initiated the 
comparative study of uncertainty monitoring (Smith et al., 
1995). Smith et al. gave a bottlenosed dolphin (Figure 1) 
a psychophysical threshold task. One response (High) was 
correct for a repeating tone of 2,100 Hz. The other response 
(Low) was correct for a repeating tone between 1,200 Hz 
and 2,099 Hz. In addition to the High and Low responses, 
the animal could make a trial-decline response that replaced 
the current trial with an easier one. Difficulty was varied so 
as to map the dolphin’s threshold for distinguishing High 
from Low.
 Figure 2A shows that High responses predominated on 
High trials and difficult Low trials; Low responses predomi-
nated on easier Low trials. The discrimination was performed 
at chance where these two response curves cross, and the 
trial-decline response was used most in this region of maxi-
mum uncertainty. The dolphin assessed accurately when he 
was liable to err and he declined those trials adaptively. That 
he responded Uncertain most to trials that were 14 Hz (one 
eighth of a semitone) from true High trials shows that his 
uncertainty responding focused on his true psychophysical 
limit.
Figure 1. The dolphin participant in the study of Smith et al. 
(1995). Photograph Credit: Dolphin Research Center, Inc., 
Grassy Key, Florida. Used with permission.
 The dolphin showed his own brand of auxiliary uncer-
tainty behaviors. On solvable trials, he swam toward the re-
sponse paddles so fast that his bow wave sometimes soaked 
our electronics. But he hesitated and wavered when the trial 
Animal Metacognition 42
was uncertain. These behaviors were distributed as his un-
certainty responses were (Figure 2B). Tolman (1927) was 
intrigued by these behaviors that he called lookings and run-
nings back and forth. He thought these behaviors could de-
fine animal consciousness for the behaviorist.
 But against that high-level interpretation are important as-
sociative considerations. First, there is the problem of objec-
tive stimulus cues—the dolphin was experiencing a class of 
error-causing threshold stimuli. Second, there is the problem 
of transparent reinforcement—the dolphin mainly received 
timeout penalties, not food rewards, for those stimuli. How-
ever, when he responded Uncertain to them, the consequence 
(a new, easy trial) was possibly more positive for him. Per-
haps the problematic stimuli and High and Low responses 
in those stimulus contexts became slightly aversive for the 
dolphin. Perhaps he was conditioned to respond Uncertain 
in those stimulus contexts. That trial-decline responses were 
aversion-avoidance responses would be a very different psy-
chological matter from their being expressions of uncertain-
ty on difficult trials.
 A common practice in this wider research area increases 
the force of associative interpretations. Researchers often 
reward animals directly for their use of the uncertainty re-
sponse (e.g., Foote & Crystal, 2007; Kornell et al., 2007; 
Hampton, 2001; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Suda-King, 
2008; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008). This methodology 
might grant the uncertainty response a positive associative 
response strength independent of any metacognitive role it 
plays in a task. It might be used because of its attractive re-
ward properties. Thus, this approach makes it more difficult 
to disconfirm associative descriptions or affirm metacogni-
tive interpretations.
 These three potential associative dimensions to perfor-
mance—stimulus cues that could occasion aversion and 
trigger avoidance, transparent reinforcement contingences 
that could catalyze conditioning processes, and the positive 
response strength accrued by directly rewarded uncertainty 
responses—all present significant challenges to this field. In 
combination, they represent the central interpretative issue 
facing researchers. The next sections of this article evaluate 
the explanatory weight borne by these associative mecha-
nisms.
 The Stimulus Component of Associative Interpretations
 Shields et al. (1997). The dolphin experiment focused on 
primary stimulus qualities (pitch height) and thus encour-
aged stimulus-based descriptions of performance. It left open 
the possibility that specific, first-order stimuli trigger uncer-
tainty responses. In fact, Smith et al. (2008) used formal 
modeling approaches to show that some uncertainty-moni-
toring data patterns can indeed be explained using low-level 
aversion and avoidance reactions to first-order stimuli. Ac-
cordingly, Shields et al. (1997) asked whether animals could 
recruit adaptive uncertainty responses in a psychophysical 
Same-Different (SD) task. The SD task requires an abstract 
judgment about the relation between two stimuli that goes 
Figure 2. A. Performance by a dolphin in the auditory dis-
crimination of Smith et al. (1995). The horizontal axis indi-
cates the frequency (Hz) of the trial. The High response was 
correct for tones at 2,100 Hz—these trials are represented 
by the rightmost data point for each curve. All lower-pitched 
tones deserved the Low response. The solid line represents 
the percentage of trials receiving the Uncertain response at 
each trial level. The percentages of trials ending with the 
High response (dashed line) or Low response (dotted line) 
are also shown. B. The dolphin’s weighted overall Factor 1 
behavior (hesitancy, slowing, wavering) for tones of differ-
ent frequencies (Hz). From “The Uncertain Response in the 
Bottlenosed Dolphin (Tursiops truncatus),” by J. D. Smith, 
J. Schull, J. Strote, K. McGee, R. Egnor, and L. Erb, 1995, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, p. 391, 
p. 402. Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological As-
sociation. Reprinted with permission.
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beyond the task’s absolute stimuli. This is why SD perfor-
mance is difficult to train in many species and why SD per-
formance is acknowledged to be cognitively sophisticated 
(Premack, 1978; Herrnstein, 1990).
 Shields et al. (1997) gave rhesus monkeys an SD density 
discrimination. On each trial, two rectangles filled randomly 
with lit pixels were shown. Animals were to make the Same 
or Different response when the two pixel densities were the 
same or different, respectively. The size of the stimulus dif-
ferences on Different trials was adjusted dynamically based 
on recent performance to constantly challenge subjects’ dis-
criminative ability. In addition, Same and Different trials at 
several absolute stimulus levels were intermixed to ensure a 
true relational performance.
 Yet monkeys, despite the difficulty and abstractness of the 
SD task, still declined adaptively indeterminate stimulus re-
lations at the crux between Same and Different (Figure 3A). 
Their performance was essentially identical to that of hu-
man participants (Figure 3B)—the two performance profiles 
correlated at 0.98. In this case, uncertainty responses cannot 
have been triggered by low-level stimulus cues because the 
relevant cue was abstract-relational in nature. In this case, 
uncertainty responses had to be prompted by the indetermi-
nacy of the relation that two highly variable stimuli instanti-
ated. This is a performance of psychological complexity and 
sophistication.
 Hampton (2001); Smith et al. (1998). These two studies 
also confirmed that stimulus-based interpretations of ani-
mals’ uncertainty-monitoring performances are untenable. 
Hampton used the Delayed Matching to Sample task—ani-
mals had to remember a sample shape and identify it after a 
forgetting interval. Smith et al. used the Serial-Probe Rec-
ognition task—animals saw a list of stimuli and then judged 
whether a probe stimulus was part of that list or not. Both 
studies amplified their originating paradigm by giving ani-
mals the uncertainty response with which to decline trials of 
their choosing.
 Both studies, too, cycled randomly through a limited set 
of stimuli that were used as memory probes. All stimuli be-
came memory probes or were the foils to memory probes 
with the same frequency. All stimuli were rewarded and non-
rewarded following both primary responses in the same way. 
No stimulus cue ever indicated any response. Only the status 
of the item as a to-be-remembered item (i.e., as a sample or 
a list member) was relevant. Thus, the psychology of this 
experiment unfolded along an internal continuum of subjec-
tive trace strength, with animals declining memory tests for 
memories of indeterminate strength. The signal of memory 
strength is very different from the signals available in tra-
ditional operant situations. The monkeys’ behavior in these 
tasks is far from traditional senses of stimulus control. In a 
limited sense, these animals were showing metamemory—
they were monitoring the contents of memory to determine 
their response.
Figure 3. A. Performance by two monkeys in the Same-Dif-
ferent task of Shields et al., 1997. The horizontal axis gives 
the ratio between the densities of the comparison box and 
the standard box for trials of different disparities. The Same 
response was correct for trials at a proportional box dispar-
ity of 1.0. These trials are represented by the rightmost data 
points. All other trials deserved the Different response. The 
solid line represents the percentage of trials receiving the 
Uncertain response at each density ratio. The percentages of 
trials ending with the Same response (dashed line) or Differ-
ent response (dotted line) are also shown. B. Performance by 
six humans in the Same-Different task, depicted in the same 
way. From “Uncertain Responses by Humans and Rhesus 
Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a Psychophysical Same-Dif-
ferent Task,” by W. E. Shields, J. D. Smith, and D. A. Wash-
burn, 1997, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
126, p. 158. Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological 
Association. Reprinted with permission.
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 Associative theorists naturally react sharply to a claim like 
this. They note that of course animals respond to internal 
stimuli—but it is still stimulus control. They note that ani-
mals’ internal representations alter the objective stimulus in-
put. Behavior is controlled by functional stimuli, not nomi-
nal, objective stimuli. They might insist that relational cues 
are still controlling stimulus cues, even if they are abstract or 
cognitive. They might even insist that states of memory are 
controlling, internal stimuli, too.
 We agree that all stimuli are internal and represented 
functionally. Neither humans nor animals experience things 
in themselves. However, the idea of internality misses our 
point. Our point is that the level of the cognitive perfor-
mance to which the uncertainty response attaches is critical 
in evaluating the cognitive level of the uncertainty response 
itself. If an animal reported uncertainty about whether a 
philosophical proof of the existence of God had a circularity 
flaw, no-one would claim that this report was an instance of 
stimulus control.
 Now one may think that uncertainty about an abstract 
judgment of Sameness-Difference, or uncertainty about a 
memory, are or are not high enough yet to quiet the stimu-
lus-control argument. That is a matter of one’s cognitive or 
associative bias. Either way, the Same-Different and mem-
ory tasks illustrate an approach. They are waypoints toward 
demonstrations of animal metacognition that cognitive and 
associative theorists will both endorse.
 We do caution, though, against the approach of calling 
everything a stimulus to preserve the idea of association-
ism and stimulus control. This does harm for a number of 
reasons. First, it will demote patent demonstrations of con-
scious metacognition in humans (or animals) down to in-
stances of behaviorism. Second, there is a theoretical casual-
ness in making everything a stimulus, because this will blur 
distinctions among performances that are profoundly differ-
ent in psychological character. In our view, responding to 
the indeterminacy of a conceptual relation or responding to 
the dimness of a memory are profoundly different from re-
sponding to a present, aversive stimulus. But we understand 
that this may not be so for everyone.
 Finally, we point out that there is a strong chance that the 
threshold state of indeterminacy between stimulus/response 
classes is psychologically distinctive and higher-level in its 
own right. For example, animals respond to internal states of 
hunger. They press bars for food. They stop pressing on sati-
ation. But, suppose a pigeon made a non-appetitive response 
to report: I don’t know if I’m hungry or not, perhaps a little 
peckish. This non-appetitive declaration of hunger indeter-
minacy would have considerable psychological complexity 
(and this declaration would be consciously metacognitive in 
humans even if responding appetitively to hunger is not).
The Reinforcement Component 
of Associative Interpretations
 Smith et al. (2006). The trial-by-trial reinforcement given 
in many comparative uncertainty-monitoring experiments 
has also encouraged reinforcement-based descriptions of 
performance. This leaves open the possibility that reinforce-
ment history allows animals to construct low-level gradients 
of reward richness that could be used to trigger uncertainty 
responses Smith et al.’s (2008) formal models also illustrat-
ed this possibility.
 Accordingly, some researchers have worked to show that 
uncertainty responses can be dissociated from a task’s re-
inforcement structure and history. In one example of this 
approach, Smith et al. (2006) gave monkeys Sparse-Dense 
psychophysical discriminations, but they also required that 
the monkeys work for blocks of trials before receiving sum-
mary feedback for the entire block. During that summary, all 
reinforcements for correct responses in the block were deliv-
ered first, then all penalty timeouts for errors subsequently. 
In this way, feedback was rearranged out of trial-by-trial or-
der, leaving monkeys with no way to associate reinforcement 
signals to particular stimuli or particular stimulus-response 
pairs. Nonetheless, one monkey of two was still able to 
make adaptive uncertainty responses (Figure 4A). This sub-
ject sustained this ability even when he was moved into new 
Sparse-Dense tasks (at new absolute pixel-density levels) in 
which he never experienced difficult or uncertain trials ex-
cept under the contingency of deferred, rearranged feedback. 
(He did receive brief periods of trial-by-trial feedback on the 
easiest, extreme ends of the new Sparse and Dense stimulus 
continua as he entered new tasks.)
 Smith et al. provided strong evidence that the reinforce-
ment structure of this task did not determine the animal’s un-
certainty-response strategy. For example, Figure 4A shows 
that the monkey declined trials at the same frequency for 
Density Bins 6 and 13, even though he was 95% and 24% 
correct at those two trial levels, respectively, when he some-
times tried them. This is contrary to all associative interpre-
tations. They would hold that animals should decline most 
those trials with the poorest reinforcement history (i.e., Bin 
13 stimuli). Yet Figure 4B shows that there was essentially no 
relationship between uncertainty responding and reinforce-
ment density in this case. The monkey was not responding to 
those reinforcement-based, associative cues. His uncertainty 
responses did not follow the task’s reinforcement pattern-
ing.
 Instead, Smith et al. (2006) showed that this monkey’s 
uncertainty responses followed his decisional organization 
of the task. Figure 4C shows that this task had a subjective 
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Figure 4. A monkey’s performance in the Sparse-Dense discrimination of Smith et al. (2006). A. The horizontal axis indi-
cates the density bin of the box. The Sparse and Dense responses, respectively, were correct for boxes at Density Bins 1-13 
and 14-26. The open circles show the proportion of trials attempted that were answered correctly. The dark circles show the 
proportion of trials receiving the uncertainty response at each density bin. The level of uncertainty responding and correct 
responding at two trial levels are singled out using red circles and green squares. B. The monkey’s performance in the same 
task, but now showing his proportion of trials declined in each density bin plotted against his proportion of trials answered 
correctly. Performance at Density Bins 6 and 13 are singled out using red circles. C. The monkey’s performance in the same 
task, but now showing separately his use of the Sparse and Dense responses (open circles and open triangles). The vertical 
line indicates the monkey’s subjective discrimination breakpoint at Density Bin 9. D. The monkey’s performance in the same 
task, but now showing his proportion of trials declined in each density bin plotted against the decisional distance of the bin 
from his decisional breakpoint (Bin 9 = 0; Bins 8 and 10 = 1; Bins 7 and 11 = 2, etc.). From “Dissociating Uncertainty 
States and Reinforcement Signals in the Comparative Study of Metacognition,” by J. D. Smith, M. J. Beran, J. S. Redford, 
and D. A. Washburn, 2006, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, p. 292. Copyright 2006 by the American 
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
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breakpoint at Bin 9 for the monkey. This is where his Sparse 
and Dense curves crossed. This was his discrimination break-
point. His uncertainty responding was symmetrical about 
that breakpoint, and he declined fewer trials as they were 
farther from that breakpoint (note again: reinforcement was 
not symmetrical about that breakpoint). Figure 4D shows 
that understanding the monkey’s uncertainty responding de-
cisionally in this way explains well his use of the uncertainty 
response.
 Thus, this monkey showed that an animal can organize 
a decisional framework for a task—with two response cri-
teria defining three response regions—absent trial-by-trial 
signals of reinforcement. He also showed that the decisional 
patterning of a task can be dissociated from that task’s re-
inforcement patterning. This is the first dissociation of its 
kind in the animal uncertainty-monitoring literature, and it 
speaks against many associative descriptions of animals’ 
performance in those tasks.
 Couchman et al. (submitted). Couchman et al. carried 
this demonstration further. Whereas Smith et al. (2006) had 
moved monkeys from one Sparse-Dense discrimination to 
another (e.g., from a Sparse-Dense discrimination involving 
absolutely sparse stimuli into a Sparse-Dense discrimination 
involving absolutely dense stimuli), Couchman et al. moved 
monkeys across qualitatively different task contexts. For ex-
ample, a monkey trained on a Sparse-Dense discrimination 
was later moved into discriminations involving shorter-lon-
ger lines or rounded-flattened ellipses. Crucially, some of 
these tasks could not be solved on the basis of pixel illu-
mination or density as in the Sparse-Dense task. Monkeys 
performed these tasks in blocks of trials without direct rein-
forcement and were still able to adaptively use the uncertain-
ty response for the most difficult trials. This shows a level 
of cognitive monitoring that goes beyond low-level associa-
tions because associations learned in one task context would 
not be useful in the next. It also shows that monkeys have 
at least some capacity for self-learning and self-instruction 
under conditions of deferred and delayed reinforcement. As 
part of that capacity, they evidently can recognize difficult 
and error-causing stimuli, and construct adaptive regions of 
behavioral uncertainty, absent immediate reinforcement sig-
nals.
 Reinforcement is a linchpin of associative accounts of 
learning and behavior. This is true no matter the exact char-
acter of the associative account (S-R, S-S, etc.). It is true no 
matter the exact character of one’s theory of discrimination 
learning (componential, configural, etc.). But in the studies 
just described, reinforcement—a primary driving force be-
hind the formation of associations—was dissociated away as 
an interpretative factor. The monkeys’ uncertainty-monitor-
ing performances in these tasks are far from traditional sens-
es of associative learning. This is an additional constraint on 
psychological theorizing about animals’ uncertainty moni-
toring. It shows that animals’ uncertainty responses can oc-
cur at a cognitive, decisional psychological level that is dis-
sociable from a task’s reinforcement structure.
 This dissociation is a necessary and constructive step to-
ward the inference that non-human species have something 
like a metacognitive capacity. However, we caution that it 
is somewhat artificial to completely dissociate reinforce-
ment cues away from uncertain situations. Not only are er-
rors, punishments, and uncertainty strongly co-occurrent, 
but also error and punishment are important teachable mo-
ments by which life signals uncertainty, doubt, danger, lack 
of knowledge, and domain non-expertise. A valid, impor-
tant part of metacognition comes from this instruction and 
the organism’s behavioral response to it. In the longer run 
of empirical study in this area, these aspects of cognitive 
monitoring—unfortunately lost in reinforcement’s dissocia-
tion—should be studied in animals as well as humans.
 The Direct Rewards Given to Uncertainty Responses
 Finally, researchers have now shown that animals still 
make adaptive uncertainty responses even when those re-
sponses bring no hint, no information, no easy next trial, no 
direct food reward, and no reward token, but only the next 
randomly chosen trial. For example, Beran et al. (2006) had 
two rhesus monkeys judge arrays of dots as having more 
or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented 
in trials (Figure 5A). Monkeys were also given an uncer-
tainty response that let them decline to make a numerosity 
judgment whenever they chose. Across center values (3-7) 
that shifted across sessions, the most errors occurred for the 
numerosities nearest the center value. Monkeys also used 
the uncertainty response most often for those most difficult 
numerosities (Figure 5B). This research joins that in Smith 
et al. (2006) in showing monkeys’ use of the purest uncer-
tainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary 
positive motivator. Therefore, this third dimension of the as-
sociative challenge falls away in the end as well.
 A Misconception about Signal-Detection Models 
of Uncertainty-Monitoring 
 Many times it is useful to model animals’ uncertainty-
monitoring performances (e.g., Smith et al., 2003). These 
models frequently have a signal-detection character (Green 
& Swets, 1966; MacMillan & Creelman, 1991), though this 
is a choice of convenience and though other modeling frame-
works might serve as well. Signal-detection models assume 
that performance is organized along an ordered series (a con-
tinuum) of psychological representations of changing impact 
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or increasing strength (memory strength, confidence level, 
etc.). They assume that the subject establishes response re-
gions by placing decision criteria along the continuum of 
cognitive states. By the usual metacognitive interpretation 
of the referent experiments, one would assume that there are 
upper and lower criteria defining three response regions, the 
leftmost reserved for one primary discrimination response, 
the rightmost for the other discrimination response, and the 
middle region demarcating indeterminate cognitive states 
that should receive uncertainty responses.
 Regarding this descriptive framework, a serious miscon-
ception has arisen. In essence it states: if the general frame-
work of the signal-detection model applies to a behavioral 
situation, then this shows directly that the performance can 
be, and should be, interpreted in a low-level, first-order, as-
sociative manner. This misinterpretation needs to be correct-
ed, because it is a common view, because it is mistaken, and 
because it does harm to theoretical progress in this area.
 Of course in some cases associative descriptions will be 
appropriate. If the underlying continuum concerns stimulus 
generalization, response strength, or aversion-avoidance, 
then, yes, the signal-detection model would be about low-
level, associative mechanisms
 But, in other cases, associative descriptions will be in-
appropriate. For the underlying cognitive continuum may 
also concern higher-level cognitive representations or even 
metacognitive states, such as degrees of conscious certainty, 
levels of confidence in retrieved memories, gradations of in-
tensity of tip-of-the-tongue states, and so forth. Note that the 
signal-detection model will be suitable even when the per-
formance is fully conscious, metacognitive, and reportable 
through language. That is, any metacognitive performance 
that humans would ever show could be described using the 
same signal-detection framework, but by all accounts none 
of them would deserve to have Morgan’s Canon aimed at 
them. Likewise, the previous sections of this article have 
shown that in many cases the primary stimulus basis for as-
sociation is not there, nor are the reinforcement signals that 
could fuel association. Without association’s ground and 
spark, it cannot occur. Another psychological description is 
required, even though a signal-detection model fits the data.
 Perhaps we can partly explain why this misunderstanding 
arises. Many times, comparative models instantiate mathe-
matically parameters that are strongly grounded in low-level 
psychological processes in mind or brain. For example, tim-
ing/counting models envision duration or event accumulators 
and comparators that may even reflect the neurophysiology 
of timing/counting. Perhaps it is natural, then, that model-
ers assume a model’s mathematics to be instantiating low-
level processes. However, this assumption does not apply 
to the models used in fitting animal’s uncertainty-monitor-
ing performances. The reason for this is that no one knows 
how the animal or human organizes the decision criteria that 
define the regions of uncertainty responding in these tasks. 
This could be done associatively or consciously. Even if one 
uses Morgan’s Canon to grant the low-level interpretation 
Figure 5. A. The screen from a numerosity-judgment trial 
in Experiment 2 of Beran et al. (2006). B. Performance by 
a monkey as a function of array size. Green circles indicate 
the percentage of trials correct in the primary numerosity 
discrimination when it was attempted. Red circles indicate 
the percentage of trials on which the uncertainty response 
was selected for each array size. From “Rhesus Macaques 
(Macaca mulatta) Monitor Uncertainty during Numerosity 
Judgments,” by M. J. Beran, J. D. Smith, J. S. Redford, and 
D. A. Washburn, 2006, Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes, 32, p. 113, p. 117. Copyright 
2006 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted 
with permission.
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provisional priority, this priority evaporates once one dis-
covers that those decision criteria are evidently organized 
cognitively, decisionally, abstractly, and dissociably from 
the task’s reinforcement signals. Then, a willful suspension 
of the low-level bias is the appropriate scientific stance.
 Meanwhile, this misunderstanding has a significant cost to 
the field because it artificially equalizes phenomena that may 
be qualitatively different in psychological level and charac-
ter. Indeed, it ignores the psychological content of perfor-
mances (their representations, their processes) to focus on 
a metaphorical, formal similarity. Worst of all, it lumps to-
gether phenomena in order to dismiss them, when what the 
field actually needs is to parse phenomena and separate them 
carefully so as to understand them clearly.
 We stress that this field needs to keep its focus sharply 
on the cognitive processes and representations that underlie 
uncertainty-monitoring performance, not on their suitability 
for signal-detection modeling. That suitability has no con-
ceivable relationship to or implication for the level or char-
acter of a psychological performance.
 A Misunderstanding about Reinforcement in 
Uncertainty-Monitoring Tasks
 There is an additional concern about existing associative 
explanations of uncertainty-monitoring performances. These 
explanations often contain statements to this effect: Naturally 
animals use the uncertainty response, for it reduces the delay 
to reinforcement in subsequent trials because it is never fol-
lowed by a timeout. Reduction in delay to reinforcement is 
itself reinforcing, and this is the likely basis for uncertainty 
responding. This claim is a version of the common claim by 
associative theorists that reinforcement rate over time is the 
molar and critical factor determining choice.
 But these explanations are also mistaken. This is a case 
wherein associative theorists have not given sufficient atten-
tion to the animal’s real situation in an uncertainty-moni-
toring task. It is not the case that the uncertainty response 
speeds up the time to the next reward. If the uncertainty re-
sponse were used on every trial, in many experiments there 
would be no rewards given, ever—the uncertainty response 
would produce an indefinite delay until reward. Or, if the an-
imal used the uncertainty response on easy trials that would 
almost certainly bring reward, it would delay reward by sev-
eral seconds each time.
 Indeed, the use of the uncertainty response will only 
speed up the arrival of the next reward under narrow cir-
cumstances—that is, if the animal can use it adaptively and 
selectively to decline only the most difficult trials in the dis-
crimination. But, to do so, the animal must have some way 
to monitor either difficulty or the risk of error, so that it can 
decline trials in that range. In essence, the associative claim 
about speeded-up rewards only stands if the animal has an 
adaptive uncertainty-monitoring performance at work in the 
background. But, in that case, the metacognitive dog is wag-
ging the associative tail.
 Regarding this misunderstanding, we would caution our 
field that there is also a theoretical casualness in attributing a 
wide range of behavioral patterns to the molar maximization 
of reinforcement. Once again, this is liable to blur distinc-
tions among performances that are profoundly different in 
psychological character. Put another way, the reward-maxi-
mization description is often functionally correct, but psy-
chologically empty. One still needs to come to understand 
the cognitive representations and processes that allow this 
maximization to occur (are they conscious and deliberative, 
or low-level and reactive). On doing so, the psychological 
description will explain the behavioral pattern more theoret-
ically richly than will the reward-maximization description.
Phylogenetic Studies of Uncertainty Monitoring and 
Associative Interpretations
 Finally, the growing body of cross-species research on un-
certainty monitoring also speaks against the possibility that 
uncertainty-monitoring performances reflect low-level asso-
ciative mechanisms based in stimuli and reinforcement.
 Beran et al. (in press). For example, Beran et al. (in press) 
gave six capuchins (New World Monkeys, family Cebi-
dae) two density discrimination tasks. In the Sparse-Uncer-
tainty-Dense task, difficult trials at the breakpoint between 
Sparse and Dense could be declined through an uncertainty 
response. This was a standard uncertainty-monitoring task 
in which rhesus monkeys (Old World Monkeys, family Cer-
copithecidae) have commonly used the uncertainty response 
adaptively. In the Sparse-Middle-Dense task, making a mid-
dle response to the same intermediate stimuli could be re-
warded. This was a standard, three-response discrimination, 
in which associative mechanisms might encourage middle 
responses for middle stimuli. Capuchins essentially did not 
use the uncertainty response at all (Figure 6A). But they used 
the middle perceptual response easily (Figure 6B).
 Beran et al. (in press) then used formal optimality studies 
to examine the reinforcement landscape of the uncertainty 
task. They found ways to raise the associative stakes in the 
task, so that now the capuchins had a strong motivation to 
learn to use that uncertainty response adaptively. To accom-
plish this, Beran et al. increased the penalty timeout in the 
uncertainty task to 90s, more than quadrupling the time cost 
for each error and increasing the advantage to be gained 
from declining difficult trials. Now, the capuchins gave up 
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potentially 30 trials for each penalty timeout (because cor-
rectly answered trials lasted about 3 s). In addition, Beran et 
al. eliminated from the task the easiest trial levels, so that the 
overall reinforcement rate in the task went down. This en-
sured that the capuchins were not just satisficing: accepting 
a decent reinforcement return based on a cognitively easy 
task strategy that did not incorporate the effortful uncertain-
way, their associative competence would have also let them 
make uncertainty responses adaptively. If uncertainty re-
sponding was just a matter of distributing available respons-
es to globally maximize the rate of rewards, they would have 
done so as well. But they did not. Taking the uncertainty 
and middle results together, one sees that each animal acted 















































Figure 6. The performance of six capuchin monkeys in the Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task of Beran et al. (2009). The hori-
zontal axis indicates the density level of the box. The Sparse and Dense responses, respectively, were correct for boxes at 
Density Levels 1-21 and 22-42. The solid line represents the percentage of trials receiving the Uncertain response at each 
trial level. The percentages of trials ending with the Dense response (dashed line) or Sparse (dotted line) are also shown. 
B. The performance of the same capuchin monkeys in the Sparse-Middle-Dense task of Beran et al. (2009), depicted in a 
similar way. From “The Psychological Organization of ‘Uncertainty’ Responses and ‘Middle’ Responses: A Dissociation 
in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella),” by M. J. Beran, J. D. Smith, M. V. C. Coutinho, J. J. Couchman, and J. B. Boomer, 
2009, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, in press. Copyright 2009 by the American Psycho-
logical Association. Reprinted with permission.
ty response. Even then, in this second experiment, five of the 
six capuchins showed essentially no use of the uncertainty 
response. One animal did use that response now, though he 
may have done so because the repeated alternation of middle 
and uncertainty tasks had finally taught him that uncertainty 
and middle responses were fungible.
 These experiments have an important implication. The 
middle task defined a class of middle discriminative stimuli 
that animals could use to anchor associative processes. Mid-
dle stimuli were transparently reinforced, allowing associa-
tive mechanisms to operate and associative connections to 
form. Clearly, those associative processes operated well in 
the capuchins. They responded middle sensitively and ac-
curately.
 If uncertainty responding was associatively based in a like 
and middle responding were manipulated within animals in 
an alternating and counterbalanced way. Clearly, the psy-
chological mechanism that underlies uncertainty responding 
is different from the associative mechanism that underlies 
middle responding. Uncertainty responding is responsive 
to some psychological signal that capuchin monkeys barely 
monitored in this task. The performances are qualitatively 
different. One performance is associatively based, the other 
is not. One performance maximized reward density, one did 
not. These animals didn’t reward maximize in the uncer-
tainty task because they didn’t apprehend appropriately that 
task’s psychological signals. The psychology of the situation 
was in explanatory control over the animals’ behavioral pat-
terns, not their need to maximize rewards or their ability to 
establish associative connections.
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 Inman and Shettleworth (1999); Sutton and Shettleworth 
(2008). These studies on pigeons made a similar point. Pi-
geons have consistently refused to express an uncertainty-
monitoring capacity, even though in the relevant experiments 
they have been directly rewarded with food for making un-
certainty responses. Shettleworth and her colleagues have 
concluded that pigeons either lack a capacity for cognitive 
monitoring, or else they express that capacity with such dif-
ficulty that experimenters can hardly show it. Yet no one 
would say that pigeons are associatively challenged—they 
are not. If there were patent associative mechanisms and 
cues available in those tasks, pigeons would find and use 
them, and reward maximize by producing the uncertainty-
monitoring data pattern. Because they do not, one sees again 
that a different, non-associative psychological description of 
the uncertainty-monitoring task is required.
 Controlled, Decisional Processes 
in Uncertainty-Monitoring Tasks
 A crucial conclusion from this discussion is that animals 
have transcended the basic associative mechanisms that have 
been proposed. Not every time, but sufficiently for the rel-
evant existence proofs. Other approaches to associative in-
terpretations contain misunderstandings as discussed above. 
In some cases, therefore, animals in their performances have 
gone to the next psychological level. Humans in their theo-
rizing have not. Another crucial conclusion is that theoretical 
development in this area lags behind empirical development. 
Researchers are still focused on asserting or refuting asso-
ciative interpretations—one sees this focus in the present 
article. Consequently, the field has not found the new cogni-
tive-decisional description of animals’ performances that is 
warranted and necessary for further theoretical advancement 
in this area. In this section, we outline some aspects of this 
description.
 Consider a traditional, auditory-threshold task. Silent in-
tervals deserve the No Sound response. Intervals contain-
ing a faint, 50%-detectable (threshold) sound deserve the 
Sound response. In this situation, only two events can occur. 
Two responses map exhaustively to those events—all events 
deserve one response or the other. There is no intermediate 
stimulus class that could ground associative processing. This 
is not a Red-Yellow discrimination with the possibility of 
attaching a third response to Orange in between. Here there 
is no “orange,” because the whole psychological range of 
the threshold task plays out within a single JND. So, there 
is nothing between Sound and No Sound except Sound-No 
Sound indeterminacy. This is why—logically—one knows 
that uncertainty responding in a task of this kind is about 
resolving indeterminacy. This is why even associative theo-
rists acknowledge that threshold states are psychologically 
unique. The rules of stimulus control are different there, 
animals have difficulty finding adaptive solutions there, ani-
mals become minimally informed observers there, and there 
are not stimuli there on which to ground operants or con-
ditioned reflexes (Boneau & Cole, 1967; Commons et al., 
1991; Davison et al., 1985; Miller et al., 1980; Terman & 
Terman, 1972). The classical psychophysicists agreed that 
the threshold state is psychologically complex (Boring, 1920; 
Fernberger, 1914; George, 1917; Thomson, 1920; Watson et 
al., 1973; Woodworth, 1938). A threshold event is not the 
clear stimulus signal that can ground a reflexive response. 
A threshold event is about the failure to assign an event to a 
stimulus class. It is about the failure to know which reactive 
response to make. The laws of association and conditioning 
break down near threshold, and this helps explain why the 
psychology of threshold is still poorly understood.
 However, one can describe the psychological structure 
of uncertainty-monitoring tasks, or indeterminacy-resolu-
tion tasks, in a way that advances us toward understanding 
these performances across tasks and species. Shiffrin and 
Schneider (1977) analyzed the information-processing con-
sequences of cognitive indeterminacy. Indeterminate mental 
representations necessarily map inconsistently and unreli-
ably onto behavioral responses. This makes those represen-
tations inadequate behavioral indicators. Consequently, the 
organism must invoke higher levels of controlled cognitive 
processes to adjudicate and resolve the indeterminacy. An 
important theoretical statement follows from this. All the un-
certainty-monitoring tasks are inconsistently mapped in Shif-
frin and Schneider’s sense All would benefit from controlled 
processing (slow, deliberate, etc.). This is true of the dolphin 
caught at threshold, 14 HZ from the standard at 2,100 HZ. 
It is true for monkeys needing to handle ambiguous memory 
traces (e.g., Hampton, 2001; Hampton et al., 2004; Smith 
et al., 1998). Atkinson and Juola (1974) also suggested that 
indeterminate memory traces require qualitatively different, 
secondary information-processing strategies.
 To grasp intuitively the situation animals face in uncer-
tainty-monitoring tasks, consider your cognitive processes 
in a world in which traffic lights gradually morphed, pixel by 
pixel, between red and green, and you had to decide whether 
your light was Red Enough to Stop or Green Enough To Go. 
Gone would be all the associative clarity of the Stop and Go 
operants and their conditioned emotional and response con-
tents. Instead, approaching a light, you would set in motion 
an elaborate criterion-setting process that would include—
sadly—your schedule, the speed of opposing traffic, guilt, 
ethics, the proximity of police vehicles, the points already 
on your license, whether your children were watching from 
the back seat, and so forth. Criterion-setting at threshold is 
a qualitatively different thing from associative responding, 
and this field needs sophisticated theories of this kind of per-
formance to apply to animals’ uncertainty-monitoring per-
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formances.
 In short, psychophysical procedures ensure indeterminate 
stimulus-response mappings and encourage controlled deci-
sion-making no matter the species. Uncertainty responses to 
threshold states probably represent a controlled decision, on 
the threshold of perception or memory, to decline the trial. 
This realization grants animals’ uncertainty responses some 
of the cognitive sophistication that is due them, without 
loading them down with consciousness or other human con-
comitants of metacognition.
 Conclusion
 In this new area of comparative inquiry, researchers have 
found innovative ways to ask animals difficult psychologi-
cal questions concerning their metacognitive capacities. It is 
natural that associative concerns have arisen as part of this 
research program. It is natural that the field would pause to 
evaluate its problems and prospects. On doing so, it is clear 
that this field shows encouraging signs of progress, includ-
ing this special discussion forum, the many insightful schol-
ars who have engaged this research, and the crucial fact that 
animals sometimes transcend reasonable associative inter-
pretations to show genuine uncertainty-monitoring perfor-
mances.
 Accordingly, we believe it is a good time for theory in 
this area to ratchet up a level to meet animals’ uncertainty-
monitoring performances, and to consider with careful mod-
els and psychological descriptions the cognitive-decisional 
performances that animals show. What kind of controlled 
processing do animals demonstrate in these tasks? Are these 
processes executive, explicit, declarative—possibly even 
conscious? These and related questions of psychological in-
terpretation have been held in abeyance while the associative 
issue dominated. However, these new questions will open up 
along with the field’s theoretical horizon, and new insights 
will emerge as they become the focus of this growing field.
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